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OPINION 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
I. Introduction 
In this consolidated appeal, appellants, Barry Cooper, 
Sandra Cooper, Emmit McHenry, George Huff, and Patrick 
McGrogan (collectively Taxpayers), filed suits in the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands seeking redeterminations of their 
tax liability from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and tax 
refunds from the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue 
(VIBIR).  In separate proceedings, the courts below dismissed 
Taxpayers‘ claims against the IRS for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  McGrogan also filed a claim against the VIBIR 
that was dismissed due to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 




This case is about Taxpayers‘ attempt to lawfully 
reduce their income tax liability by claiming certain tax 
benefits afforded exclusively to bona fide residents of the 
United States Virgin Islands.  The Virgin Islands
1
 is a 
territory of the United States.  As a territory, the Virgin 
Islands does not share the same sovereign independence as 
the states of the union; rather, the power to pass rules and 
regulations governing territories like the Virgin Islands rests 
with Congress.  U.S. Const. Art. IV § 3, cl. 2; Bluebeard’s 
Castle v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 321 F.3d 394, 400 (3d 
Cir. 2003).   
 
In the Naval Service Appropriation Act of 1922, 
Congress passed legislation applying the Internal Revenue 
Code of the United States to the Virgin Islands.  See Pub. L. 
94-932 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1397); Chase Manhattan 
Bank, N.A. v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 300 F.3d 320, 322 
(3d Cir. 2002).  This legislation provides that ―[t]he income-
tax laws in force in the United States of America and those 
which may hereafter be enacted shall be held to be likewise in 
force in the Virgin Islands of the United States, except that 
the proceeds of such taxes shall be paid into the treasuries of 
said islands.‖  48 U.S.C. § 1397.  This statutory scheme has 
come to be known as the ―mirror code‖ because Congress 
designed Virgin Islands tax law to mirror the tax laws in 
effect on the mainland.  Chase Manhattan Bank, 300 F.3d at 
                                              
1
 Unless otherwise designated in this opinion, the term 
―Virgin Islands‖ refers to the United States Virgin Islands. 
6 
322.  As a result of this legislation, the words ―Virgin 
Islands‖ are substituted for the words ―United States‖ 
throughout the Internal Revenue Code.  Bizcap, Inc. v. Olive, 
892 F.2d 1163, 1165 (3d Cir. 1989).  
 
Congress has crafted special rules governing the 
taxation of Virgin Islands residents.  One of these rules states 
that any ―bona fide resident of the Virgin Islands‖ will be 
granted a full exemption from paying her federal income 
taxes—and therefore will not be required to pay taxes to the 
federal government, so long as she files a territorial tax return 
that fully reports her income and then fully pays her territorial 
taxes to the VIBIR.
2
  See I.R.C. § 932(c); Abramson Enters., 
Inc. v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 994 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 
1993).  This exemption is significant because Congress 
authorized the Virgin Islands government to create an 
Economic Development Program granting substantial tax 
incentives to certain Virgin Islands taxpayers.  See I.R.C. 
§ 934(b) (Congressional authorization); 29 V.I.C. § 708(b) 
(bona fide residency requirement); 29 V.I.C. § 713b (income 
tax reduction).  As applied to this case, Taxpayers might have 
realized considerable tax savings under the Economic 
Development Program, but only if they qualified as bona fide 
residents of the Virgin Islands.   
 
                                              
2
 Before 2004, I.R.C. § 932(c) required only that the taxpayer 
claim bona fide residency in the Virgin Islands ―at the close 
of the taxable year.‖  I.R.C. § 932(c) (West 2003).  The 
statute was amended in 2004 and changed the requirement to 
―during the entire taxable year.‖  I.R.C. § 932(c) (West 2004).  
These amendments, however, are not relevant in this appeal. 
7 
B. Procedural Posture 
Between 2001 and 2004 Taxpayers claimed bona fide 
residency in the Virgin Islands and eligibility for the tax 
benefits granted by the Economic Development Program.
3
  
Consequently, Taxpayers filed tax returns with the VIBIR and 
paid their taxes only to the Virgin Islands government.  
Taxpayers did not file federal income tax returns. 
 
1. Claims Against the IRS 
In late 2009 and early 2010, Taxpayers were issued tax 
prepayment deficiency notices by the IRS challenging their 
claims of bona fide residency in the Virgin Islands.  In 
separate proceedings, Taxpayers challenged the deficiency 
notices in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  The 
District Court granted the IRS‘s motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the Tax Court was the only proper forum for 
their suits against the IRS and therefore the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the dispute.
4
   
 
                                              
3
 McHenry claimed bona fide residency in 2001 and 2002.  
The Coopers claimed bona fide residency in 2002 and 2003.  
McGrogan and Huff claimed bona fide residency in 2002, 
2003, and 2004. 
 
4
 The courts below issued certifications of final judgments 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) as to the 
dismissals of the claims against the IRS brought by the 
Coopers, McHenry, and Huff. 
8 
Each Taxpayer has also filed redetermination petitions 
in the Tax Court.  Those proceedings are currently pending. 
 
2. Claims against the VIBIR 
After receiving deficiency notices from the IRS in late 
2009, McGrogan, in an effort to avoid double taxation, filed a 
petition in the District Court of the Virgin Islands in February 
2010 seeking a refund of taxes paid to the VIBIR.  The 
District Court granted the VIBIR‘s motion to dismiss 
McGrogan‘s refund petition because McGrogan filed his 
claim outside the statute of limitations.  See I.R.C. § 6511(a) 
(statute of limitations for a refund petition expires either three 
years after the time of filing an income tax return or two years 
after the time of payment of the tax owed, whichever expires 
last).  
  
The Coopers, McHenry, and Huff also filed refund 
claims against the VIBIR.  These claims are still pending 
before the District Court and are not at issue in this appeal. 
9 
III. Discussion5 
A. Taxpayers’ Claims Against the IRS 
The District Courts correctly held that the Tax Court is 
the only venue for Taxpayers‘ claims against the IRS because 
Congress has designated the Tax Court as the only court with 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a tax prepayment deficiency dispute.  
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States 
―is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and 
the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that 
court‘s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.‖  United States v. 
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  ―A waiver of the Federal 
Government‘s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally 
expressed in statutory text, and will not be implied.‖  Lane v. 
Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citation omitted).  The 
sovereign immunity doctrine applies to the IRS because it is 
an agency of the United States.  See Beneficial Consumer 
Disc. Co. v. Poltonowicz, 47 F.3d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 
Section 6213 of the Internal Revenue Code provides 
the sole waiver to sovereign immunity that authorizes a 
taxpayer to challenge a federal income tax prepayment 
                                              
5
 We have appellate jurisdiction over McGrogan‘s appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In light of the Rule 54(b) 
certifications of final judgments as to the claims brought by 
the Coopers, McHenry, and Huff against the IRS, we have 
appellate jurisdiction over those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court‘s 
grant of a motion to dismiss.  Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 
676 (3d Cir. 2010). 
10 
deficiency notice.  Under this section, a taxpayer who 
receives a tax prepayment deficiency notice has but one 
venue to seek a redetermination:  the Tax Court.  See I.R.C. § 
1613(a).  Federal law does not permit a taxpayer to file a 
challenge to a deficiency notice in a federal district court 
unless the taxpayer pays the contested amount in full before 
filing suit.  See United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining 
Co., 553 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2008).  Here, Taxpayers did not pay the 
contested amount in full before filing suit in the District 
Court.  Therefore, as the courts held, the Tax Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction over Taxpayers‘ redetermination 
petitions. 
 
Taxpayers assert that the sovereign immunity bar does 
not apply and that their claims were properly brought in the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands for three reasons:  (1) by 
enacting 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), Congress purportedly waived 
sovereign immunity by vesting exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction over all federal tax claims applicable to the Virgin 
Islands with the District Court of the Virgin Islands; (2) the 
deficiency notices issued by the IRS were actually deficiency 
notices issued by the VIBIR, and therefore the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction over this dispute under 
48 U.S.C. § 1612(a); and (3) public policy necessitates a 
finding of subject matter jurisdiction in the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands.  Each argument is without merit. 
 
1. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity in 48 U.S.C. § 
1612(a) 
Taxpayers assert that 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) serves as a 
waiver of sovereign immunity.  This argument is unavailing.  
11 
Section 1612(a) states that ―[t]he District Court of the Virgin 
Islands shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal and 
civil proceedings in the Virgin Islands with respect to the 
income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands, regardless 
of the degree of the offense or the amount involved . . ..‖  48 
U.S.C. § 1612(a).  Taxpayers thus argue that the statute vests 
exclusive jurisdiction over their redetermination petitions in 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands because their claims 
are civil proceedings with respect to the income tax laws 
applicable to the Virgin Islands.  However, as Taxpayers 
acknowledge, we rejected this very argument in Birdman v. 
Office of the Governor, 677 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
In Birdman, we held that the grant of exclusive 
jurisdiction contained in Section 1612(a) is merely a 
―geographic limitation.‖  Id. at 176.  Thus, the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands‘ jurisdiction is ―‗exclusive‘ only against 
other courts ‗in the Virgin Islands.‘‖  Id.  Consequently, if 
there were a question as to whether the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands or another court in the Virgin Islands had 
jurisdiction over a tax dispute, Section 1612(a) would vest 
jurisdiction over that dispute in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands.  Id.  The statute does not grant the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands exclusive jurisdiction over all 
matters that implicate the tax laws applicable in the Virgin 
Islands.  Id.  A redetermination petition must be brought in 
the Tax Court even if it involves issues relating to the Virgin 
Islands.  See WIT Equip. Co. v. Director, Virgin Islands 
Bureau of Internal Revenue, 185 F. Supp. 2d 500, 503 (D.V.I. 
2001).   
 
We remain bound by Birdman unless the decision is 
reversed by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en 
12 
banc.  In re Lemington Home for Aged, 659 F.3d 282, 294 n.6 
(3d Cir. 2011).  Consequently, we agree that the courts below 
correctly interpreted I.R.C. § 6213(a) and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) 
and will affirm their holdings that the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands lacks jurisdiction over Taxpayers‘ challenges 
to the deficiency notices they received from the IRS. 
 
2. Coordination Between the IRS and VIBIR 
Notwithstanding the sovereign immunity bar and our 
decision in Birdman, Taxpayers argue in the alternative that 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands has an independent 
source of subject matter jurisdiction over their 
redetermination petition under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) because 
the notices of deficiency sent by the IRS to Taxpayers were 
actually issued on behalf of the VIBIR.  The basis for this 
contention is that two alternative positions in the deficiency 
notices sent to Taxpayers by the IRS state ―you failed to fully 
pay your income tax liability to the USVI.‖  
 
Taxpayers assert that the language of the deficiency 
notices is evidence that the IRS stepped into the shoes of the 
VIBIR and was acting on behalf of the VIBIR in an attempt 
to collect taxes for the Virgin Islands government.  
Consequently, Taxpayers state that under this theory the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction to hear 
their claim because redetermination petitions filed against the 
VIBIR are properly brought in the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands.  See 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (stating that the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands has exclusive jurisdiction with 
respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin 
Islands); 33 V.I.C. § 943 (stating that redetermination 
13 
petitions filed against the VIBIR must be brought in the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands). 
 
The IRS has a different explanation as to the meaning 
and purpose of the deficiency notices:  the IRS sought to 
collect taxes owed to the federal government, a fact that was 
indicated in the notices the IRS sent to Taxpayers.  The 
primary position of the IRS was that Taxpayers were not bona 
fide residents of the Virgin Islands under I.R.C. § 932(c)(4).  
If this primary position failed, Taxpayers‘ tax liability to the 
Virgin Islands Government would become relevant because 
the IRS would argue in the alternative that Taxpayers were 
liable to pay taxes to both the United States Government and 
Virgin Islands Government.  As a result, the IRS needed to 
include the statement that Taxpayers failed to fully pay their 
taxes to the VIBIR as an alternate position to preserve the 
issue if it arose during litigation.   
 
Ultimately, there is no basis in law or fact suggesting 
that the IRS could act or was acting on behalf of the VIBIR.  
Although the IRS and the VIBIR coordinate tax policy, the 
IRS is responsible for enforcing federal tax laws and the 
VIBIR is responsible for enforcing territorial tax laws.  The 
IRS and VIBIR are therefore separate, distinct, and 
independent taxing authorities.  See McHenry v. C.I.R., 677 
F.3d 214, 220-21 (4th Cir. 2012).  Furthermore, even if the 
IRS could step into the shoes of the VIBIR, Taxpayers‘ 
theory is unsupported by the factual record.  The deficiency 
notices were issued by the IRS, not the VIBIR.  The notices 
asserted a federal tax deficiency, not a Virgin Islands tax 
deficiency.  In fact, the tax redetermination petitions filed by 
Taxpayers acknowledge that the deficiency notices were 
issued by the IRS.  Moreover, Taxpayers‘ redetermination 
14 
petitions stated that they were challenging the position of the 
IRS, not the VIBIR.   
 
The IRS‘s explanation of the deficiency notices and 
the documentary record makes plain that the IRS was not 
acting on behalf of the VIBIR and that the notices were not 
seeking a determination of Virgin Islands tax liability.  As a 
result, the District Courts correctly rejected the argument that 
the redetermination petitions had been filed by the IRS acting 
on behalf of the VIBIR.  
 
3. Taxpayers’ Policy Arguments 
Taxpayers point to the possibility of inconsistent 
results and double taxation if the cases against the IRS filed in 
the Tax Court reach different outcomes than the cases filed 
against the VIBIR in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  
Taxpayers further state that allowing the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands to resolve the entire dispute would improve 
judicial economy by allowing one court to resolve the related 
issues in the redetermination petitions brought against the IRS 
and the VIBIR.  Consequently, Taxpayers argue that these 
considerations support a finding that the entire litigation 
should be before one court:  the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands. 
 
Although we are mindful of the possibility of 
inconsistent results and double taxation, Taxpayers‘ claims 
must proceed under the jurisdictional framework established 
by Congress.  The Tax Court has jurisdiction over federal tax 
deficiency proceedings under I.R.C. §§ 6213 and 6214, 
federal district courts have jurisdiction over tax refund 
proceedings under I.R.C. § 7422, and the District Court of the 
15 
Virgin Islands has jurisdiction over proceedings implicating 
territorial tax law under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).  In light of the 
unambiguous statutory scheme established by Congress 
governing the adjudication of tax disputes and the firm 
sovereign immunity bar, Taxpayers‘ policy arguments are 
unpersuasive.  See United States v. Craig, 694 F.3d 509, 512 
(3d Cir. 2012) (―[N]either fairness considerations nor rules 
applicable to private disputes can alone provide grounds for 
abrogating sovereign immunity.‖ (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Additionally, Taxpayers‘ fear of being subject to 
double taxation without a remedy appears to be misplaced 
because the United States and the Virgin Islands have 
established an administrative procedure that could grant them 
relief in the event of double taxation.  See Tax 
Implementation Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Virgin Islands, 1989-1 C.B. 347, Art. 6 
(1989).  Nonetheless, even if Taxpayers might be unfairly 
subjected to double taxation, this equitable consideration does 
not override the sovereign immunity bar that may only be 
waived by Congress. 
 
B. McGrogan’s Claims Against the VIBIR 
As noted above, the only claims against the VIBIR that 
we are being asked to consider are McGrogan‘s requests for 
refunds for tax years 2002, 2003, and 2004.  The District 
Court correctly granted the VIBIR‘s motion to dismiss 
because the statute of limitations barred his claims against the 
VIBIR.   
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain refund 
claims brought outside of the statute of limitations.  See 
16 
Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d 350, 353-
54 (3d Cir. 2000).  The applicable statute of limitations 
provides that a taxpayer seeking a refund must file a claim for 
a refund within either three years from the time he filed his 
income tax return or two years from the time he paid the tax 
owed, whichever period expires last.  See I.R.C. § 6511(a).  
McGrogan concedes that he filed his refund petition outside 
of this period, so the District Court did not have jurisdiction 
to adjudicate McGrogan‘s claims against the VIBIR due to 
the expiration of the statute of limitations. 
 
McGrogan advances three arguments in an attempt to 
overcome this jurisdictional bar:  (1) the mitigation provisions 
contained in I.R.C. §§ 1311-14 permit his untimely claim; (2) 
the statute of limitations was equitably tolled; and (3) the 
doctrine of equitable recoupment permits his untimely claim.  
Each of these arguments is without merit. 
 
1. Mitigation Provisions 
The mitigation provisions in the Internal Revenue 
Code allow qualifying taxpayers to bring refund claims that 
would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.  See 
I.R.C. § 1311(a); TLI, Inc. v. United States, 100 F.3d 424, 
427-28 (5th Cir. 2012).  Mitigation applies only if:  (1) there 
has been a final determination under § 1313; (2) there has 
been a ―circumstance of adjustment‖ under § 1312; and (3) 
one of the ―conditions necessary for adjustment‖ in § 1311(b) 
has been met.  See Kappel’s Estate v. C.I.R, 615 F.2d 91, 94 
(3d Cir. 1980).  ―The relief provided by the mitigation 
statutes is limited to defined circumstances, and does not 
purport to permit the correction of all errors and inequities.‖  
Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. C.I.R., 72 F.3d 1338, 1341 (7th Cir. 
17 
1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
mitigation provisions should be given a liberal interpretation.  
See Koss v. United States, 69 F.3d 705, 709 (3d Cir. 2005).  
The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that each of the 
three mitigation provisions applies.  Id. 
 
The mitigation provisions do not afford relief to 
McGrogan because he cannot show that a ―circumstance of 
adjustment‖ has occurred.  McGrogan claims a circumstance 
of adjustment for the double inclusion of income.  However, 
the Internal Revenue Code permits mitigation for the double 
inclusion of income only if the taxpayer‘s claim involves ―an 
item which was erroneously included in the gross income of 
the taxpayer for another taxable year or in the gross income of 
a related taxpayer.‖  I.R.C. § 1312(1).  Such a double 
inclusion has not occurred in this case.  McGrogan does not 
allege having erroneously paid taxes in an incorrect tax year 
nor has he claimed to have erroneously paid taxes for a 
related taxpayer.  Rather, McGrogan‘s overpayment of taxes 
is a situation not contemplated by the mitigation statute:  
payment to the wrong taxing entity.  Although we should 
liberally interpret the mitigation statute, we may not rewrite 
its terms.  As a result, the mitigation statute does not apply 
because the circumstance of adjustment claimed by 
McGrogan is outside the ambit of I.R.C. § 1312(1). 
 
Even though McGrogan‘s claim falls outside the scope 
of the mitigation statute, he seeks an exception to it because 
of the special relationship between the United States and the 
Virgin Islands and the purportedly collusive coordination of 
tax policy between the IRS and the VIBIR.  McGrogan also 
points to a possibility of double taxation.  Again, while we are 
cognizant of the equitable concerns presented in this case, 
18 
these policy arguments still do not change the fact that 
McGrogan‘s claims fall outside of the mitigation scheme 
established by Congress.  We are powerless to create a 
judicial exception to the mitigation statute to accommodate 
him.  See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 602 
(1990) (absent a statutory exception, when statute of 
limitations is expired, ―a suit for refund, regardless of whether 
the tax is alleged to have been ‗erroneously,‘ ‗illegally,‘ or 
‗wrongfully collected,‘ may not be maintained in any court.‖).  
For these reasons, McGrogan may not use the mitigation 
statute to avoid the statute of limitations bar. 
 
2. Equitable Tolling 
McGrogan argues that the doctrine of equitable tolling 
should allow him to proceed with his untimely claim.  This 
argument overlooks the settled rule that I.R.C. § 6511 
prohibits equitable tolling in refund cases.  See United States 
v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) (―Section 6511‘s 
detail, its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in 
both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing 
of exceptions, taken together, indicate to us that Congress did 
not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended 
‗equitable‘ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.‖).  
Although Congress has amended Section 6511 since 
Brockamp, none of the exceptions listed in the statute of 
limitations apply to McGrogan‘s situation.  We see no reason 
to depart from the Supreme Court‘s instructions in Brockamp 
and therefore reject McGrogan‘s argument that equitable 
tolling affords him an exception to the statute of limitations. 
19 
3. Equitable Recoupment 
McGrogan‘s assertion of the doctrine of equitable 
recoupment is also unpersuasive.  When applicable, equitable 
recoupment may allow a taxpayer to receive a credit for a tax 
overpayment in a subsequent tax year.  See In re Pransky, 318 
F.3d 536, 544-45 (3d Cir. 2003).  However, equitable 
recoupment is not an independent source of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See Dalm, 494 U.S. at 608.  As noted above, 
unless an exception like mitigation applies, the federal courts 
lack jurisdiction to adjudicate refund petitions brought after 
the expiration of the statute of limitations.  See 
Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d at 353-54.  As a result, because the 
District Court had no independent source of jurisdiction, the 




                                              
6
 We continue to be concerned about the possibility of double 
payment of taxation to the IRS and to the VIBIR in cases 
such as the ones at issue here.  The IRS assured us at oral 
argument it was willing to participate in the administrative 
procedure set up by the Tax Implementation Agreement: 
 
   Ms. RUBIN:  At this point I don‘t believe there‘s any 
sign that there would be double taxation.  We‘ve indicated – 
the IRS has indicated its willingness to participate in competent 
authority once it is determined how much taxes are owed. 
 
   Obviously, if a particular taxpayer wins on their 
challenge, if they prove that they‘re bon[a] fide Virgin Islands 
residents and they prove that the income in question was 
Virgin Islands income, there won‘t be any double taxation 
because there won‘t be any residual U.S. tax liability.  But if, 
20 
                                                                                                     
instead, there is determined that, yes, there is U.S. tax liability 
here because these were not Virgin Islands residents, or their 
income was not Virgin Islands income and, therefore, not 
subject to the EDP benefits, then we‘ve indicated, as shown in 
the record cites I gave you for the Cooper notices of 
deficiency, that we‘re willing to go in a competent authority at 
that point to determine which tax authorities should be getting 
the money. 
 
      The IRS then qualified the above statement: 
 
  Ms. RUBIN:  I‘m not entirely certain what the 
remedy would be in a situation where someone, unlike 
the Coopers, failed to do a protective refund claim, 
failed to take that step to protect their right to go and get 
money back from the Virgin Islands BIR if, in fact, it is 
determined that they should have instead paid all of 
their taxes to [the IRS]. 
 
 Counsel for the Taxpayers replied to the IRS‘s 
argument by pointing out that the protective mechanism of a 
refund claim was set up in 2006, after the time to file a 
protective income tax return for calendar years 2001 and 2002 
had already closed.  Therefore, McHenry and McGrogan 
could not have taken the protective actions advocated by the 
IRS.  
  
 In view of the statement by the IRS that negotiation 
would be initiated to prevent double taxation – in the situation 
we could envisage if, for instance, McGrogan lost his pending 
case in the Tax Court – we trust that the IRS will live up to its 
commitment to prevent double taxation.   
21 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Courts. 
